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Abstract
This paper uses elementary arguments from game theory to consider the interaction between protago-
nists involved in environmental problems.  It is argued that ‘generic’ global problems often result in a
Prisoner’s dilemma, with the status quo as equilibrium.  Also, a brief consideration of the Kyoto
Protocol confirms that if developing countries were asked to join, their dominant strategy would be to
refuse, and that the recent withdrawal of the United States leaves other signatories in a precarious posi-
tion.  Finally, the paper focuses on a specific recent project, the CO2 Ocean Sequestration Field
Experiment, to demonstrate that many of the difficulties hampering the resolution of global-scale envi-
ronmental problems have to be dealt with at local levels as well.
Key Words: game theory, environmental problems, Kyoto Protocol, CO2 Ocean Sequestration Field
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1. Introduction
Game theory has been developed by mathematicians as a rational framework for a broad variety of
interactions between players.  Historically speaking, the development of the theory of probability by
Blaise Pascal in the 17th Century may have been the earliest attempt to provide a mathematical founda-
tion for games of chance.  That a devout Jansenist like Pascal devoted some of his genius for what often
carries negative social connotations is interesting in itself, but more importantly shows how a serious
theoretical approach may be given to games perhaps frivolous per se.  Today, game theory is a thriving
and challenging field of knowledge widely applied in many areas of practical interest (economics, strat-
egy etc).  Since it ultimately deals with human behavior, it may appear as just another attempt to reduce
human beings to objects.  Clearly, all caveats applicable to science and technology when they are related
to human reality hold for game theory. 
It is well beyond the scope of this paper to dwell into even moderately advanced aspects of game the-
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ory.  Instead, some elementary but essential features will be used in a particular context to tentatively
shed a different light on problems of great concern.  Readers unfamiliar with game theory are encour-
aged to acquire some background with a basic text (e.g. Dixit and Skeath, 1999.) Those seeking
advanced applications of game-theoretical knowledge in the analysis of environmental issues can con-
sult several recent publications (e.g. Carraro and Filar, 1995; Hanley and Folmer, 1998.) 
The next Section will present elementary aspects of game theory that are sufficient throughout the
paper.  In Section 3.0, a ‘generic’ environmental problem will be defined, and its solution will be dis-
cussed.  Section 4.0 will pay closer attention to the Kyoto Protocol, while Section 5.0 will focus instead
on the tribulations of a specific scientific project aimed at advancing the state-of-knowledge on the
oceanic carbon sink. 
2. Background
A game is defined as an interaction between rational players.  Players can choose between strategies.
To any possible outcome of the game, different payoffs are assigned to each player.  It would be trivial
to just postulate that rational players should seek to maximize their individual payoffs.  One fundamen-
tal point of game theory is that players should seek to do so according to their perception of other play-
ers’ moves.  We will give two short examples below.
The first one illustrates a simultaneous-move game, and is none other than the famous Prisoner’s
dilemma.  Two criminals in their twenties are caught for a string of robberies, but the evidence against
them for the most serious charges is rather weak.  In fact, they would likely be handed a short jail term
(e.g. 5 years) if none of them confesses to anything.  Each is interrogated separately and offered a deal:
to reveal the full extent of their criminal activities and receive a lenient treatment, or to keep silent with
the risk that the other prisoner may confess.  If both cooperate, the prosecutor would seek a 10 year
prison term.  If only one talks, he would receive a 2 year sentence (as a reward for his crucial testimo-
ny), but his resilient partner would serve 20 years behind bars. 
The game typically is represented as a two-by-two table, shown below as Table 1 (two is the number
of available strategies to each player, and a table, i.e. a planar artifact is possible because only two play-
ers are involved.).  The rows and columns in Table 1 are filled with pairs of outcomes for the players,
their payoffs in game theory terminology; the First Prisoner’s payoffs are shown as left-hand-side
entries.
The Second Prisoner first assumes that his partner cooperates (first row): it then is clear that he him-
self is better off cooperating (upper left corner).  He next assumes that the First Prisoner remains silent
(second row); in this case as well, he receives the lightest sentence by cooperating (lower left corner).
Thus, the Second Prisoner’s rational attitude is always to cooperate.
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Second Prisoner
Keep silentCooperate
2 years, 20 years10 years, 10 yearsCooperateFirst Prisoner
5 years, 5 years20 years, 2 yearsKeep silent
Table 1.  The payoff table for a typical version of the Prisoner’s dilemma (left-hand-side payoff is
assigned to row player).
Applying the same reasoning from the vantage point of the First Prisoner, we would easily conclude
that he too should choose to cooperate.  For this game, a convergence of strategic choices therefore
exists and is [Cooperate, cooperate]; this is known as a Nash equilibrium for the game, thus named after
the American mathematician John Nash.  The outcome is a dilemma inasmuch as it does not represent
the best possibility for the players, namely [Keep silent, keep silent]. 
The game illustrates well how players choose their moves given their expectations of other players’
behavior.  It should be noted that the ordering of different payoffs is important, while the precise values
are not (e.g. the precise length of the jail sentences in the above game): one simply could have ranked
outcomes as 1, 2, 3 and 4, for example; this is true as long as one deals with pure strategies (in repetitive
games, players may choose to apply a probabilistic approach where they mix strategies; payoff values
then become important).  At any rate, the worth of game theory always is highly dependent on the care-
ful evaluation of payoffs beforehand.
The next example illustrates a sequential-move game between Player 1, who alone starts the game,
and Player 2, who alone ends the game.  To show how flexible game theory is, we actually construct an
example where the same person at two different stages of his/her life plays the game: Player 1 is 20
years old, and Player 2 60 years old, while the person represented by both players is expected to pass
away at 70.  The game itself is a version of Pascal’s wager formulated in a game theoretic context.
Pascal’s wager simply states that although the existence of an afterlife may be questionable, possible
rewards for a righteous life in a hypothetical afterlife are too great to risk losing.  Although rational, one
can seriously challenge the effectiveness of this argument in matters of faith and moral conduct, which
is a reminder of an earlier caveat about the complexity of human reality.  Yet, we now proceed to formu-
late our game more precisely.
We surmise that the probability that an afterlife exists is 50%.  If it does exist, rewards for those who
led a righteous life are huge, say 1,000,000 on an arbitrary scale (“Heaven”); for those who were right-
eous most of their life, but abandoned the right path, as well as for those who spent many carefree years
before amending their ways, the afterlife prize is assumed to be the same and substantial, e.g. 100,000
(“Purgatory”); those with an entirely carefree life would receive nothing (“Hell”).  Meanwhile, there are
“earthly” benefits associated with a carefree life, i.e. 1,000 per year.  We are now in a position to con-
struct a game tree, shown in Figure 1.
Payoffs at the end of the game (“Death”) are shown on the right-hand side.  Please note that with two
distinct Players, payoffs would be represented by pairs of values as in the previous simultaneous-move
game example.  Values are the sum of earthly benefits that are certain, and of heavenly rewards that are
50% probable. 
This type of game is analyzed backward, starting with the move contemplated by Player 2 (at age 60).
It is obvious that in all cases, Player 2 is better off choosing a righteous path for his expected 10 years’
life left, since 500,000 exceeds 60,000 and 90,000 is larger than 50,000.  Given that fact, Player 1 (at
age 20) should rationally choose a lifestyle leading to the greater payoff, between 500,000 and 90,000,
i.e. a righteous life as well.  In this example, a completely righteous life represents the rollback equilibri-
um of the game.
It is important to note that the order of playing may be very important in a sequential-move game
(with distinct players).  Unlike the case of a genuine simultaneous-move game, information about initial
moves is known to the players of subsequent moves.  For example, if the Second Prisoner of the simul-
taneous-game example above knew about the First Prisoner’s move (i.e. if the game were sequential),
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there would be no dilemma as can easily be verified: the rollback equilibrium would be for both to keep
silent, and the outcome would be optimal (5 years’ sentence each).
3. An Ideological Conflict and a Challenge
Let us consider two very broad classes of players interacting in a game with simultaneous moves.
Although members of such classes would generally act independently, this great complication is left for
further analysis when the specifics of a given situation would be known.  It is equally true that in reality,
these classes of players would interact repeatedly.  For the time being, however, only a one-move game
is being considered.
The first class of players can be labeled as the Developers.  It consists of public and private groups -
companies, businesses, government agencies etc. - which for a number of reasons (profit, market share,
strategic security, policy implementation...) seek to extract important resources, such as oil, coal, miner-
al ore, or to simply develop undisturbed environments for expanded human utilization.  In all cases,
these activities are potentially rewarding for the Developers, but also detrimental for the affected envi-
ronments.
The second class of players will be designated as the Environmentalists.  These can be grassroots
activists, concerned individuals, government agencies etc.  Their role is primarily to protect the environ-
ment and act as watchdogs.  Historically, they have emerged as a class because of severe environmental
damage caused by the activities of the Developers.  Although a great deal of this environmental degra-
dation may have occurred inadvertently over a long period of time, it has created a basic lack of trust
between Environmentalists and Developers, and has resulted in a legal framework where disputes
between the two classes may be arbitrated.
We now turn to a one-time conflict between the two classes.  Even though the argument that will be
made is thought to be rather general, and should be applicable to many situations insofar as a simplistic
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Figure 1. The game tree for a game-theoretic version of Pascal’s wager.
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approach can suffice, let us assume that the object at stake is the wish of the Developers to access
greater resources of fossil fuels.  After all, fossil fuels are not only at the root of modern development,
but they also have been a source of widespread conflicts and epitomize a fundamental lack of sustain-
ability in our societies.  The Developers have two basic strategies:  
A: use more fossil fuels but also do something good for the environment
B: use more fossil fuels without paying much attention to the environment
It can be argued that many more possibilities than A and B should be considered.  In particular, there
is no provision for the Developers to fail in their goal to access greater resources of fossil fuels.
Whether this stance is too cynical or not, variations on the theme presented here are almost limitless,
and can be investigated later.  What the Developers could do for the environment under Strategy A,
might include compensatory development of renewable energy, restoration of damaged ecosystems,
expanded environmental research, inclusion of enhanced fossil fuel production safeguards etc.  Aside
from the very important issues of future interactions with the Environmentalists, and of public percep-
tion in general, the positive environmental mitigation measures contemplated by the Developers are
costly in a basic and perhaps short-term sense.  The extent of such costs is relatively greater in a compet-
itive context within the class (e.g. with nations and companies competing with one another).
Faced with this hypothetical conflict, Environmentalists have two elementary strategies as well:
a: vigorously oppose the use of more fossil fuels
b: oppose the use of more fossil fuels, but allow for concessions
The latent inflexibility in these choices, whereby using more fossil fuels will be opposed in principle,
is a natural match to the narrow spectrum of strategies contemplated by the Developers.  Concessions
under Strategy b could be a moderate stance on certain permitting issues, which would save time or
diminish risks of litigation for the Developers.  The intent of concessions by the Environmentalists
would be to coax the Developers to ‘do something good for the environment’, while perhaps increasing
their appeal to a broader membership.  Making concessions may be costly for the Environmentalists’
credibility, however, especially in relative terms when members of the class compete with one another.
Thus, while concessions naturally seem to make more sense in a context of successive-move games,
especially if a negotiation process is allowed to take place, the simultaneous-move context captures well
the fact that internal competition within each player class introduces a great deal of uncertainty and risk.
In this sense, one can anticipate internal competition to radicalize the players’ positions, which in turn
may prevent the establishment of trust.  Such radicalization may not only proceed within each group of
players as a result of some internal competition, but through a positive feedback mechanism, radicaliza-
tion in one group will also reinforce the tendency in the other group: after all, it may only take one
aggressive Developer to cause severe or irreversible damage to a given environment, while it may only
take one hard-line Environmentalist to block an ongoing permitting process.
We may now build a 2 × 2 payoff table for the game.  To simplify, numbers from 1 to 4 will be used
to qualitatively rank possible outcomes for each class of players; higher values represent more favorable
payoffs.  The left-hand-side numbers will indicate the Developers’ expected ‘return’ and consequently,
the right-hand-side values represent the Environmentalists’ expected ‘reward’. 
For the Developers, the best outcome is to wrest concessions from the Environmentalists while doing
nothing substantial for the environment.  Of course, this combination of respective strategies [B, b]
clearly is the worst for the Environmentalists.  By the same token, it is obvious that the
Environmentalists would prefer that something good were done for the environment without conceding
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anything to the Developers, i.e. a situation corresponding to scenario [A, a].  Such positions allow the
diagonal terms of the payoff table to be filled, and express a high degree of polarization between the two
player classes since ‘what is best for one group is worst for the other’ and vice-versa.  This state of
affairs led us to use the obsolete-sounding Section heading ‘ideological conflict’, because bridging the
gap between the players may truly be a daunting task.  As a matter of fact, it can be shown that the out-
come of the game is already determined with the two diagonal entries set at (1, 4) and (4, 1), respective-
ly for the upper-left and lower-right cells of the table.  For the sake of completeness, the table will, how-
ever, be completed.
To assign payoff values to the off-diagonal cells, we will take a non-cynical stance, perhaps for a
change.  In other words, we will not doubt that Environmentalists would rather see something good done
for the environment even if it costs them making concessions.  Therefore, scenario [A, b] is more valu-
able than scenario [B, a].  We will also assume that the Developers sufficiently value concessions from
the Environmentalists to be ready to do something good for the environment in return for such conces-
sions.  In other words, the two classes of players have exactly the same ranking for the two scenarios [A,
b] and [B, a].  This convergence of good will, however, will not suffice to bring out [A, b] when the
game is played out.
The payoff table for the game is shown in Table 2.  It is immediately apparent that each group of
players has a dominant strategy.  Whether the Environmentalists allow concessions or not, by selecting
either Strategy available to them, the Developers should always pick Strategy B in response.
Conversely, no matter what the Developers may choose to do, between Strategies A and B, the
Environmentalists should always prefer Strategy a in response.  The Nash equilibrium of the game is
therefore the status quo [B, a] with the pair of mediocre payoffs (2, 2).  The dominant strategy for the
Developers is to do nothing for the environment, while that for the Environmentalists is to vigorously
oppose the use of more fossil fuels without making any concession.  As formulated, the game is a
Prisoner’s dilemma since the outcome of the game clearly is not ‘the best outcome for everyone
involved’, i.e. [A, b].  In other words, neither class of players obtains from the other what they value
most: the Environmentalists are left with a damaged environment, while the Developers cannot expect
any concession and must prepare themselves for litigation and perhaps adverse public opinion.
It cannot be overemphasized that the above approach is very simplistic.  Before any ‘game’ is played,
the implicit polarization of players in only two groups, their limited choices of ‘bleak’ strategies and the
assumption of a purely simultaneous-move game all may be highly questionable.  The disturbing result
of such an exercise, however, may reveal a more dangerous fracture than we would like to imagine
between those whose task is to exploit natural resources and those whose mission is to protect the envi-
ronment.  The fact that game theory at its simplest may show that a degraded environment and acrimo-
nious litigation could constitute the elements of some equilibrium is rather disturbing.  It presents at
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Environmentalists
Strategy bStrategy a
3, 31, 4Strategy ADevelopers
4, 12, 2Strategy B
Table 2.  Payoff table for a ‘generic’ one-move environmental conflict (left-hand-side payoff is assigned
to row player).
least all real players in this ‘game’ with the challenge of avoiding this purported outcome.  Game repeti-
tion in general and the assumption of leadership by one or several players in particular are typical mech-
anisms by which a Prisoner’s dilemma may be avoided, though such desired outcome is by no means
guaranteed.  The issue of leadership is brought up in the next Section..
4. The Kyoto Protocol
We start with the fictitious context of three identical parties contemplating the signature of an interna-
tional treaty aimed at curbing the accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.  Identical means
a symmetry in the attitudes of (groups of) Countries A, B and C with respect to the potential benefits as
well as the costs associated with any commitment to such a treaty.  By signing the treaty (and ratifying it
if required), a player in this hypothetical game will partially contribute to a better environment, but will
also incur significant expenditures. 
The nature and magnitude of a Greenhouse Effect caused by anthropogenic emissions is such that the
environment would not benefit very much if the treaty is signed by only one of the three players.
Payoffs corresponding to a damaged environment will be described by three arbitrary levels 1, 2 and 3.
The worst outcome of 1 is for a Country to be the sole bound signatory to the treaty: in this case, the
environment will hardly be better overall while that Country would bear a great economic burden; on
the other hand, the other two parties would enjoy a relative competitive edge while sharing any
improvement of the environment, however small it might be; for them, therefore, a payoff of 3 can be
assigned when the ‘other’ Country alone has signed the treaty.  If no one agrees to the terms of the
treaty, obviously no one would spend any resources, although the environment certainly would be the
worse off; in this situation, a payoff of 2 can be given to each Country.
By symmetry in argumentation, a best possible outcome of 6 for a Country would be to be the only
party refusing to join the international agreement.  In this case, both economic and (substantial) environ-
mental advantages would be reaped; for the other parties, a payoff of 4 would reflect the healthier state
of the environment due to their joint commitments, but the slight economic disadvantage that they
would suffer for having one party staying out of the treaty.  Finally, if everyone participates in the
treaty, there would be a level playing field in terms of economic burden and the best possible environ-
ment could be preserved; in this case, everyone would get a payoff of 5.
Tables 3 represent the payoff tables for this ‘symmetric’ three-player game, where ‘Yes’ indicates an
agreement to the treaty and ‘No’ a refusal to participate.  Payoffs are listed as triplets of values respec-
tively assigned to Countries A, B and C.
A cell-by-cell inspection reveals that this hypothetical game has no fewer than four equilibria,
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Country A: NoCountry A: Yes
Country BCountry B
NoYesNoYes
3, 3, 16, 4, 4YesCountry C4, 6, 45, 5, 5YesCountry C
2, 2, 23, 1, 3No1, 3, 34, 4, 6No
Table 3. Payoff tables for a ‘symmetric’ three-player Kyoto Protocol (payoffs are assigned to A, B, C,
respectively, from left to right).
although three of them globally correspond to the same situation.  In one case, no Country would spend
anything for a dismal payoff of (2, 2, 2.) In the remaining three cases, any two Countries would commit
themselves to the treaty while the third party would enjoy a ‘free ride’; in other words, the three more
desirable equilibria all would result in a healthy environment, with a payoff of 4 for the signatories,
while ‘allowing’ the non-participating party to enjoy relative economic advantages to boot (and a maxi-
mum payoff of 6).
The positive aspect of the symmetrical game is that a commitment to the treaty by any one of the three
players would be sufficient to eliminate the undesirable equilibrium when no one would sign.
Unfortunately, the real (groups of) players in the Kyoto Protocol analyzed as a game are not symmetri-
cal at all. 
Grouping nations in a judicious way may not be easy and certainly is likely to be open to criticism.
We will, however, propose a choice based on weight (i.e. the scale of greenhouse gas emissions) and, in
a loose sense, ‘philosophy’.  Therefore in our choice, Country A represents large populous developing
nations, Country B the United States and Country C the bulk of the other wealthiest nations notably
including Western Europe and Japan.  For an example of a much less simplistic analysis of the Kyoto
Protocol and its most recent ‘satellite agreements’, the reader is referred to Löschel and Zhang (2002.) 
From the outset, the new asymmetric game has to be ‘larger’ than the mere signing of the Kyoto
Protocol, since developing nations are exempted from any commitment to the treaty, at least temporari-
ly.  This aspect of the Kyoto protocol can in fact be backed up by game theory.  For Country A, develop-
ing has to be the top priority for a long while; its ability to incur substantial and immediate expenses for
environmental benefits is obviously very doubtful.  With emissions per capita one order of magnitude
less than those of the richest nations, Country A also holds a significant ‘moral high ground.’ If Country
A were nevertheless asked to play the game, its payoffs for all possible scenarios would have to reflect
such specific circumstances.  The maximum reward of 6 would continue to correspond to everyone else
signing the Kyoto Protocol, but because of the unbearable drain that compliance would require on its
own resources, the next best scenarios would now be when only one other party signs the treaty (payoff
of 5) or no one at all (payoff of  4).  The ranking of all possibilities if Country A were coerced to partici-
pate in the Kyoto Protocol would straightforwardly decrease as indicated in the partially-filled payoff
Table 4.
The reason why Countries B and C have been left out of the game so far is that, granted that Country
A’s payoffs have been accurately represented, Country A’s dominant strategy is to stay out of the Kyoto
Protocol no matter what everyone else decides to do.  In other words, only the right-hand-side table is
relevant, and the game can now be simplified as involving only two players.  It should thus be no won-
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Country A: NoCountry A: Yes
Country BCountry B
NoYesNoYes
5,  , 6,  , YesCountry C2,  , 3,  , YesCountry C
4,  , 5,  , No1,  , 2,  ,  No
Table 4.  Partially filled payoff tables for an ‘asymmetric’ three-player Kyoto Protocol extended to
developing countries grouped as Country A (payoffs are assigned to A, B, C, respectively,
from left to right).
der why the architects of the Kyoto Protocol crafted a binding treaty that would not implicate develop-
ing nations, at least initially.  It is very doubtful and it should not be expected that the developing coun-
tries’ commitment to ... development would soon be allowed to accommodate strong environmental
safeguards, as illustrated by the recent international conference on climate change in New Delhi
(Honolulu Star Bulletin, 2002c). 
We can now turn our attention to the reduced game, being cognizant that a smaller game offers fewer
opportunities for commitment.
If Countries B and C had the same philosophy regarding the Kyoto Protocol (i.e. toward the need to
reduce atmospheric emissions of greenhouse gases), the smaller two-player game would be symmetric.
It is straightforward to show that two equilibria would then exist, namely the remnants of the four equi-
libria of the larger three-player symmetric game: these two possibilities correspond to both Countries
signing the treaty or to both Countries abstaining from participation in the Protocol.  For the sake of
completeness, the symmetric payoff table is shown in Table 5, where the row-and-column order of
Countries B and C has been switched, with the convention adopted in Section 3.0:  the left-hand-side
payoffs are assigned to the row player.  This symmetric game would be quite nice inasmuch as the com-
mitment by any player to sign the Kyoto Protocol would entice the other player to do likewise.
Unfortunately, even the reduced game is not symmetric.
Cultural values prevailing in Countries B and C strongly affect the payoffs assigned to different sce-
narios, just as straightforward economic needs remain overwhelming for Country A.  While member
nations in both groups B and C are all comparably wealthy, as measured for instance by GDP per capita
(with proper adjustments for currency matters), their attitude toward environmental issues is very diver-
gent, as measured for instance by greenhouse gas emissions per capita.  The fact that a North American
emits on the average at least twice as much carbon dioxide (CO2) than his (her) Western European or
Japanese counterpart is troublesome from the outset.
Even though such arguments may seem like old clichés, it is undeniable that the United States has
built its enormous might and success on a credo of social Darwinism played out over a short history.
This can be traced back to the country’s Calvinist roots.  Thus, a belief in man’s ability to adapt to - and
to succeed despite - any social and environmental hardship lies at the core of the ‘American Dream.’
Such collective self-confidence and faith is often scorned as naïveté elsewhere, but the global results
achieved by this ‘young’ nation are nonetheless impressive.  Europe and Japan are not foreign to world-
wide power and glory, but their optimism has been tested and certainly tempered over a much longer
period of time, when some nations grabbed a leadership role while others’ might waned; it has often
been argued that such optimism was largely shattered by the horrendous conflicts of the 20th Century.
American attitudes certainly do not favor any restrictions placed on economic growth, the paramount
measure of personal and overall success, especially if they are imposed through an international legal
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Country C
  NoYes
 1, 3 4, 4YesCountry B
 2, 2 3, 1No
Table 5.  Payoff tables for a ‘symmetric’ two-player Kyoto Protocol (left-hand-side payoff is assigned
to row player).
framework.  Thus and for radically different reasons, the United States often aligns its position with that
of developing nations, and less surprisingly with that of oil producing (OPEC) countries when global
environmental issues are on the table.  Such political maneuvering was quite clear during the so-called
U.N.  Johannesburg Earth Summit in 2002, with European Environment Commissioner Margot
Wallstrom denouncing the ‘unholy alliance’ of the U.S. and developing countries in watering down a
biodiversity pact (Honolulu Star Bulletin 2002a), or with the U.S. and OPEC nations opposing higher
targets for renewable energy use (Honolulu Star Bulletin, 2002b.)
The payoffs attributed to Country B (the United States) in Table 6 realistically reflect its adverse atti-
tude toward the Kyoto Protocol.  In other words, the country’s priorities warrant that not signing (or not
ratifying) the treaty is a dominant strategy.  That stance has considerably hardened since the election of
George W. Bush in 2000, with the withdrawal of the U.S. from the previous administration’s signature,
even though no one envisioned a ratification of the signed treaty by the U.S.  Congress as even remotely
possible.  Interestingly, the principal argument given by the Bush administration for the formal U.S.
withdrawal was the exemption granted large developing countries from emission targets, and thus the
creation of an ‘uneven playing field.’
The payoffs given Country C were only modified to make the signature of the Kyoto Protocol no less
attractive than not participating, even in the face of Country B’s dominant strategy: Japanese and
Europeans probably see enough political benefits and perhaps a certain amount of face-saving in signing
the treaty to offset the costs of ‘going at it alone.’ This approach gives Country C a leadership role if it
participates in the Kyoto Protocol, though it is quite a risky situation.  As far as the environment is con-
cerned, it is likely that the benefits of the Kyoto Protocol may prove insufficient unless a more critical
mass of signatories can be reached (and granted that present signatories are able to meet their binding
targets under the Protocol!)
This simple look at the Kyoto Protocol using elementary notions of game theory could be seen as a
vain exercise since the proposed payoff tables are qualitative and based on fait accompli: different coun-
tries’ positions today are given, and not the results of a future one-move game (in other words, the game
has already been played.) The cursory analysis, however, confirms the extraordinary difficulties lying
ahead if any real progress should be achieved in curbing atmospheric emissions of greenhouse gases.  A
very real challenge is to find ways to overcome the negative attitude of the U.S., since it is believed to
be deeply rooted in that nation’s cultural values.  One great hope rests with the design of reward mecha-
nisms that would strongly appeal to American ideals, such as tradable carbon emission permits.
Needless to say, such ideas have been aggressively pursued, but will be dauntingly difficult to imple-
ment.
After considering game theory on a very global scale, the next Section will examine how strategic
moves that deeply affected a small environmental project could be cast in a game theoretic framework. 
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Country C
  NoYes
 1, 3 2, 4YesCountry B
 3, 2 4, 2No
Table 6.  Payoff tables for a ‘realistic’ two-player Kyoto Protocol (left-hand-side payoff is assigned to
row player).
5. Strategic Moves in a Small Project
5.1. Background
This Section coincidentally deals with a project launched in Kyoto in December 1997 under the aus-
pices of the Climate Technology Initiative (CTI.) This modest international scientific research Field
Experiment (referred to as the Field Experiment below) was designed to investigate the behavior of CO2
injected into the deep ocean.  It would have addressed some of the many questions related to the concept
of CO2 Ocean Sequestration.  Succinct information on the initial parameters of the Field Experiment and
difficulties encountered in its early years can be found in Nihous (2003) and de Figueiredo et al. (2003.)
In the spring of 1998, the project was first sited along the Kona Coast of the Big Island of Hawaii, in the
Ocean Research Corridor of the Natural Energy Laboratory of Hawaii Authority (NELHA.) At that
time, it was envisioned that the CO2 storage facility would be land-based, with a small seafloor-mounted
pipeline reaching the injection water depth of 800 m from the shoreline.  Public concerns about the pro-
ject first surfaced in the local press in March 1999.
5.2. A surprising proposal (May 2000)
After more than a year of sustained opposition to the project, two prominent activists based on the
island of Maui made a surprising proposal to the project team.  They offered to join the project’s
Technical Committee (TC) in order to offer more effective advice in the areas of environmental conser-
vation and Hawaiian native rights, respectively.  Their only request was to be provided with ad hoc help
if and when TC membership entailed substantial expenses, as with international travel.  Per se, the pos-
sibility of cooperation at a modest cost, rather than the pursuit of a bitter debate, was attractive to a few
project participants, especially among those dealing with the problem ‘head-on’ in Hawaii.  Already, the
TC had recognized the need to expand its membership with the addition of expert benthic biologists. 
Unfortunately, the element of surprise in the activists’ proposal was the result of previous lengthy and
frustrating argumentation between the two sides over more than a year.  In particular, the team’s techni-
cal and scientific expertise, used to great lengths in establishing that the Field Experiment would not be
harmful to the local environment, essentially was flouted.  This attitude particularly hurt researchers
from the academic sector who are routinely held to rigorous standards, without being alien to sometimes
bitter debate.  In other words, earlier interaction could bring considerable doubt about the wisdom of
accepting the two activists within the TC.  The implicit hope that their inclusion suddenly would boost
cooperation lacked credibility, while the risk that many other opponents could still hamper project exe-
cution was substantial. 
The Project (participants) could accept or turn down the Activists’ proposal, following one of two
obvious strategies.  At the same time, the Activists might or might not cooperate in either case, and pur-
sue their adamant opposition.  In a game-theoretic context, the Project’s payoffs can be rated from 1 to 4
exactly as for the Developers in the generic case of Section 3.0.  This choice results from an overall
preference for the Activists’ cooperation, but coupled with a fundamental lack of trust.  The worst payoff
of 1 corresponds to the fear of a Trojan horse, i.e. accepting the Activists within the TC only to witness
their relentless opposition.  Clearly, then, turning down the Activists’ proposal is a dominant strategy for
the Project, as shown in Table 7.  Payoffs for the Activists actually need not be specified: as long as z >
t, which is very likely, a Prisoner’s dilemma is obtained: the status quo [Turn down, Oppose] represents
the Nash equilibrium of the game.
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Not surprisingly but sadly, the project team rejected the two activists’ proposal, and their opposition
never abated henceforth. 
5.3. A stunning reversal (February 2001)
In March 2000, after an extensive technical and economic evaluation, the project team had decided
that project infrastructure would be entirely based offshore of NELHA, with the CO2 storage facility
located on a dynamically-positioned floating vessel.  Thus, the small CO2 delivery pipeline would go
straight down to the seafloor without crossing the shallow, high-energy and environmentally sensitive
shoreline and reef zones.  Moreover, the issue of removing all underwater infrastructure upon comple-
tion of the short project was automatically resolved with a configuration based on the ability to pay out
and retrieve the pipeline as many times as needed. 
This decision was considered by the team to potentially simplify the overall permitting process, while
there was some hope that many in the public would appreciate the improvements afforded by the revised
design.  Clearly enough, however, a move offshore was likely to be exploited by project opponents as a
sign that the project could take place anywhere if it relied on a floating ship instead of shore-based infra-
structure.  For NELHA itself, in the narrowest sense, this could lead to decreased rental revenues,
although the project team was ready to pay fees to use the Ocean Research Corridor alone, a practice
apparently without precedent at NELHA.  The NELHA administration was informed of the design
change in a timely manner, but never indicated thereafter that such a change warranted a new submittal
of the original application (for NELHA to host the project).
At that juncture, NELHA was standing behind its October 1999 approval to host the project in spite of
some local public opposition, while the sponsors of the project in general, and the U.S.  Department of
Energy (DOE) in particular remained hopeful that such difficulties would be ironed out in time.  In the
following months, though, the permitting process under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
greatly polarized public opposition, with the publication of a Draft Environmental Assessment (EA)
report in August 2000 and the subsequent collection of public comments.  This in turn started alarming
local politicians.  As a matter of fact, the permitting process substantially slowed down and its favorable
conclusion became less obvious than ever.  By early 2001, the DOE had not yet released a Final EA as
well as their official opinion.
In the meantime, the possibility than the project should be relocated had been informally discussed
within the project team, though its members remained quite divided on the issue.  It is likely that such a
discussion would have been known to NELHA.  Also, NELHA got a new executive director by the end
of 2000, and he was keen on evaluating ongoing issues from a ‘fresh’ perspective; in particular, it is
doubtful that he felt any personal commitment toward the project.  He actually never met with anyone
directly working for the Field Experiment! 




4, t2, zTurn down
Table 7.  Partially filled payoff table for a one-move game between Activists opposing the Field
Experiment and Project participants (left-hand-side payoff is assigned to row player).
The situation culminated in a stunning reversal in February 2001.  At the regular monthly Meeting of
the NELHA Board of Directors, Board members voted to rescind the authorization for the project to
take place in the Ocean Research Corridor.  This vote violated the sunshine law in effect for public
agencies inasmuch as the issue was not slated for a vote on the Meeting’s published agenda.
Remarkably, the local media was apprised of this decision before the project team itself, and promptly
notified them!
It may be interesting to examine this apparent case of ‘backstabbing’ from the point of view of game
theory.  It will then be apparent than NELHA acted ‘rationally’, if not nicely, considering a payoff struc-
ture that was credible at the time of their decision.  We will initially consider a sequential game where a
first player is the Project (team) and a second player NELHA.  The first player must decide whether the
project should stay at NELHA or be relocated elsewhere, while the second player must then decide to
maintain its support of the project or not.  Clearly, the strategy of withdrawing support after the project
leaves does not make much sense and will be indicated by a dotted line (a “lost” strategy).
In determining payoffs for this game, a maximum value of 3 is assigned to the Project team if it
decides to leave the NELHA site; a lower value of 2 is given in the case when there is no planned relo-
cation while support from NELHA continues.  Clearly, the worst scenario for the Project members, with
a payoff of 1, would correspond to a decision to stay followed by an eviction from the site (i.e. if
NELHA then rescinds their prior agreement).  It should be noted that the ordering of Project payoffs for
the scenarios [Leaves, ...] and [Stays, Not] perhaps reflects the author’s personal opinion in late 2000
and early 2001; in reality, there remained very strong reasons for key Project participants to avoid a
relocation, from logistical readiness to setting an example in principle (or avoiding a precedent in yield-
ing under public pressure.) The effect of this ordering will be further discussed below.  More essential
perhaps is the fact that the NELHA strategy [..., Rescinds] was essentially unknown, or at least over-
looked by the Project, which limited their ability to avoid a very embarrassing situation.
From the point of view of NELHA, the crucial element is their perception that if the Project chose to
stay, they would rather rescind their authorization (payoff of 3) than not (payoff of 2).  In other words, a
breach of loyalty toward Project sponsors and participants, even with an evaluation of future possible
consequences (retaliation) did not seem so risky to NELHA when weighed against the wrath of local
activists and politicians.  If correct, the ranking of those two payoffs definitely evolved under public
pressure; otherwise, it is believed that NELHA would not have granted an initial authorization at all in
October 1999.  Naturally, the worst scenarios for NELHA would occur if the Project left the site before
NELHA could make any decision.  In this respect, NELHA was aware of all strategies available to the
Project and deemed them credible.
Thus, we can propose the extensive form of the sequential game in Figure 2, with a payoff structure
that was highly credible in early 2001.  Payoffs are shown as pairs with values for the Project in the left-
hand-side.  A rollback analysis shows that NELHA would select either [Stays, Rescinds] or (obviously)
[Leaves, Not], and that the Project would then have picked [Leaves, Not].  This rollback equilibrium
obviously is very detrimental to NELHA, with a payoff of 1.
It is interesting to verify that reversing the payoffs of 3 and 2 for the Project alone or for NELHA
alone would not alter the outcome of the game (inasmuch as the Project recognized the existence of
both NELHA strategies.) If all payoffs of 3 and 2 were switched, however, the rollback equilibrium
would correspond to [Stays, Not] with payoffs of (3, 3.) This situation is believed to represent the play-
ers’ positions in 1999 and early 2000, when neither leaving the site nor rescinding the NELHA agree-
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ment were serious options. 
We now consider how NELHA did avoid the negative outcome of the previous game by seizing a
first-mover advantage.  It suffices to recast the game with NELHA as the first player.  It is easy to realize
that if NELHA does not act on their agreement (i.e. adopt the strategy “Not”), the playing order is in fact
unimportant (in other words, such a strategy on their part really is equivalent to not playing); therefore,
payoffs are the same for the scenarios [Not, Stays] and [Not, Leaves] when NELHA plays first as for the
scenarios [Stays, Not] and [Leaves, Not], respectively, when the Project was the initial player.  The case
when they would rescind their October 1999 authorization must now be considered.
When NELHA was the second player in the previous two-move game and would opt for the strategy
“Rescinds” (after the Project had initially played “Stays”), it was implicitly assumed than the Project
then automatically had to “Leave”.  If not, i.e. if the Project had had in fact any choice left, a three-
move game would have been needed.  This complication was not avoided just to simplify the analysis,
but because in early 2001, NELHA had no credible reason (or had not received any signal to the con-
trary) to believe that the Project had sufficient time, will power and resources to vigorously contest a
‘surprise’ decision (to rescind) if they made it.  NELHA must have been aware of possible future ‘retali-
ations’, but did not judge them potentially harmful enough.  A ‘vigorous contest’ could have consisted
of immediate and decisive legal action initiated by the Project, but events showed that NELHA had been
correct in their risk assessment.  In a sense, their action proved to be ‘a successful version of Pearl
Harbor.’
Thus, payoffs for the scenario [Rescinds, Leaves] when NELHA plays first are the same as for the sce-
nario [Stays, Rescinds] proposed when the Project was the first player.  The previously ‘hidden’ case
[Rescinds, Stays] is now resurgent, but remains so unlikely that it is shown by dotted lines with very
poor payoffs for both players since litigation would be bitter and uncertain.
The corresponding game tree is shown in Figure 3, with payoff values for the Project in the left-
hand-side as before.  A rollback analysis shows that the Project would select either [Rescinds, Leaves]
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Figure 2.  Extensive form (game tree) of the sequential-move game where Project participants would
first decide whether to relocate the Field Experiment away from NELHA’s Ocean Research











or [Not, Leaves], and that NELHA would then have picked [Rescinds, Leaves].  This rollback equilibri-
um obviously is very favorable to NELHA, with a payoff of 3.  Thus, seizing the initiative as just out-
lined allowed NELHA to reverse payoffs associated with the equilibria of the two versions of essentially
the same two-move sequential game.
5.4. Another stunning reversal (August 2002) 
As 2001 wore on in the aftermath of NELHA’s decision, efforts to hold a field experiment on CO2
ocean sequestration in Hawaiian waters had to be abandoned.  With less time left and a fast decreasing
budget, the project team opted to substantially reduce the scope of any possible attempt to release CO2 in
deep waters.  Perhaps more importantly, it was decided to move the project to Norway.  This country’s
exceptional marine infrastructure, large output of offshore oil and gas and its expert representation in the
TC all favored such an action.  One logistical difficulty with this choice, however, stemmed from the
roughness of the Norwegian Sea and the relative remoteness of sites with deep enough waters: any field
experiment would have to be conducted in the summertime. 
By January 2002, an expedited permitting process was completed with Norwegian environmental
authorities for the smaller field experiments.  More precisely, a permit exemption was granted because
of the project’s small size, short duration, research goals and benign predicted impact.  This was an
exceptionally favorable outcome when measured against several frustrating earlier years, though possi-
bly a ‘poisoned gift’ in retrospect.  During the following months, the team frantically prepared the nec-
essary infrastructure to complete the project by the end of September 2002.
Incensed by the permitting exemption granted by the Norwegian government, several high-profile
environmental groups launched an appeal process shortly before the summer of 2002.  These groups
quickly became aware of the project’s history and of its failure to be executed in Hawaii.  The appeal
process proceeded in July and early August 2002, and the Norwegian permitting agency stood firm on
its original ruling.  Only a final decision by the Minister of Environment himself was necessary to close
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Figure 3.  Extensive form (game tree) of the sequential-move game where NELHA would first decide
whether to rescind its agreement to host the Field Experiment in the Ocean Research Corridor













Late in August 2002, the Minister’s decision was handed down as another stunning reversal for the
project.  He revoked the permit to proceed until certain international legal matters could be clarified.
Overruling the findings of his own agency, he basically obliterated any realistic possibility for the pro-
ject to take place in offshore Norwegian waters in 2002, as favorable summer conditions were waning.
The fact that the Minister was about to participate in the U.N.  World Environmental Summit in
Johannesburg, and that he probably wished to have a ‘clean slate’ with environmentalists is believed to
have weighed heavily in his decision.  It is left as an exercise to frame the project’s misfortunes in
Norway as a game, but similarities with the February 2001 NELHA reversal should be apparent.  In par-
ticular, the two middle branches of the game tree where NELHA was the first player could easily be rep-
resentative of the situation, the other branches being merely hypothetical (e.g. dotted lines.) In his brief
review of the events in Norway, Haugan (2003) notes that “a decision [by the Minister] which is illogi-
cal, unfair, and counter to all professional advice, turns out to be politically correct.”  This clear-sight-
ed statement lends credibility to a game-theoretic approach where protagonists are rational players:
political correctness should be in a politician’s best interest. 
In the last analysis, it is likely that both incarnations of the CO2 Ocean Sequestration Field
Experiment, in Hawaii and in Norway, failed from strategic moves executed by entities with permitting
authority for short-term gains and little fear of reprisals.  In both instances, project participants suffered
from insufficient access to critical information (e.g. a knowledge of the mere possibility that a ‘game’
was being played.)
6. Conclusions
This paper has attempted to show in the simplest way how elementary game theory can frame envi-
ronmental problems in a revealing light.  For example, ‘generic’ global problems often lead to hard-line
positions, with the status quo as equilibrium.  This is detrimental to the environment, and does not even
represent the protagonists’ best interests.  Avoiding such outcomes poses enormous challenges.  These
are more specifically apparent when considering the Kyoto Protocol; a game theoretic approach con-
firms that if developing countries were asked to join, their dominant strategy would be to refuse, and
that the recent withdrawal of the United States leaves other signatories in a precarious position.  When
focusing next on a recent project, the CO2 Ocean Sequestration Field Experiment, it became clear that
many of the difficulties hampering the resolution of global-scale environmental problems have to be
dealt with at local levels as well.  This linkage is rather explicit in the minutes of a recent panel discus-
sion entitled “Public Outreach and CO2 Sequestration”, reported in Freund (2003.)  The similarity of
hurdles encountered in a wide spectrum of environmental issues may simply reflect the globalization of
modern societies at the beginning of the 21st Century, with the unprecedented development of electronic
communications.  Perhaps more fundamental to such commonality, however, is the fact that decision
makers at all levels tend to act as rational players in interlocking games.
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